Historical Consequences

Introduction


 
In the known physical world, everything has a limit; nothing is universal or forever. The Big Bang and the Wasting Whimper are the limits of our experience and doings. That much, it seems to me, is settled.

What happens in between is a 'booming, buzzing confusion' ...

 

 

Middle Age

Our Universe is about 13 billion years old. It probably has a life expectancy of at least 40 billion years, which means we are now in the early portion of its adult mid-life. Our Solar System got its start some 8 or 9 billion years after the Big Bang. Our star, Sol, has a life expectancy of about 10 billion years, which means we are experiencing the middle of its existence. Our planet, Earth, is dependent on its star from birth to death, so what we see around us is the fullness of a mature planet balanced between life and death.

We are the anomaly in that sequence, as Homo sapiens is a newcomer, having only arrived as recently as 250,000 years ago - the last split second of Universal History. Like all living things, we are self-concerned in our struggle to exist. We easily ignore and forget the grand scale of things in which we are enmeshed. Since it is mostly human adults who do the thinking and teaching, the Universe is seen from our mature adult poiint of view. All of us old enough to know what it is to be a mature adult project that state of being onto everything around us. Being adult-centric is a bias which infects everything; thus, our learning and teaching are adult-centric.
Mature adults do not imagine their decline and demise any more than children. Senesence and death always take us by surprise when they take up residence in our bodies and minds. The uniformitarian idea - thus it is, so it was, and so it will be - comes naturally to those who are in the full exercise of their bodies and minds. This, despite the massive pile of evidence around them to the contrary. Even reflecting on the garbage can, full of corpses of meals past, should disabuse anyone of  the permanence of now. But, we disassociate: that is what happened to them.
It always amazes me that young couples, fruity and sweaty in their ripeness, do not recognize their parents as themselves to be, or feel the dryness of grandparents hovering over their children. The life cycle is right there, right before our eyes, an invisible part of everyday life.

Our Universe, our Solar System, our planet and our lives attest to the impermance of everything. All that is in accord with the experience and theory that we live in an ever-changing, chaotic space-time. To say that it is always changing not only conforms to common observations, but more importantly implies the transformation, possibly the erasure, of what was and is. Even if we believe in some sort of universal conservation, we are not thereby required to believe that the specific positron corresponding to a certain electron in a pair production will re-unite with its original mate at the same place and in the same configuration as orginally created. Conservation in this Universe is not that strict. Only certain properties of the created electron-positron pair need be recaptured by the end of time; properties which could be acquired from others by inheritance. Moreover, the arrow of time prevents the total symmetry of pair production: the annihilation occurs at a different, later time than the creation. Our Universe, it seems, is incapable of recapitulation. At its most fundamental level, our Universe is not about preserving us, or anything like us, or anything else for that matter.

Therefore, I take it as a fact that we are transitory, and always transitional as well. That fact has major implications for our sciences and appreciation of value. Those who believe there are eternal truths, that there is some sort of "real" (Platonic) or "ideal" (Kantian) Universe behind or beyond our immediate experience, are burdened with proof of it by that fact. It is not enough to dismiss this world as appearance, and then point out the apparition; of another, seemingly permanent, solid world, as do all the dualist philosophers and religionists before and since Plato. No one can make practical decisions starting with the supposedly real world of non-experience. That is especially true of the supposed spiritual world, which thousands of disagreeing shamans say is like this or that or the other thing.
 

I think the foregoing discussion supports this heuristic: positing any theory of forces or decisions, whether absolute or relative, thereby also proposes a theory of causation. It is this heuristic which connects politics, law and ethics to science. Theories of voluntary choice imply something about the organization of the world in which choices are made, just as physical and chemical formulae only work if they accurately describe the world.

Making Order

Absolutists have always have an incredible burden of proof placed on them, for they must establish that their proposed principles work for all time. Religionists and spiritualists have an even more severe problem, for they appeal to supernatural beings or demi-urges beyond any immediate experience. That appeal requires knowledge and proof of another Universe whose workings somehow govern the one in which we live. Since all of our modern science is barely able to establish the laws of our experience, the claim to have certain knowledge of another world is stunning.
I only have confidence in a much more limited world, which leads me to propose a limited range for voluntary choice. We cannot know what, if any, will be the effects of our decisions, although we base them on a supposed material order. When I drive my truck to the store, I assume turning the key will start it, that the engine will turn the wheels, that the roads will take me to the store, that the store is what I think it is, and a lot more. While what I believe will happen in fact almost always comes out that way - I manage to get to the store and back - the short run is not predictive of the longer run. Even though I have a fairly good track record in predicting the outcomes of national elections a year or two in advance, forty years ago I did not predict the United States turning into a corporate (Fascist) State. I had a growing sense of apprehension starting in the late 1980s, but the present state of affairs only became apparent to me as a likely outcome less than a decade ago. Well known historians and prognosticators have not been any more accurate. Who knew the Soviet Union would collapse, and when? Who warned us about Al Qaeda?
This weekend, in the midst of the growing collapse of American power in the Middle East, a spate of Conservative authors appeared on CSPAN's Book TV. One of them declared the United States "unconquerable." Another duo "proved" that minorities do not suffer health care discrimination in the United States. The most interesting part of that lecture on health care was the authors' admission at the start that minorities have shorter life spans, higher incidences of serious diseases such as cancer, AIDS, and diabetes, and have uncontrolled hypertension and other maladies that could be corrected with proper medical care. Yet, their astonishing proposal is minorities do not have these problems as a result of discrimination. (Instead, they just cannot afford going to doctors, so they don't go.)
These questions and examples show that people have wildly different ideas about what processes are going on and where they lead. We are often incorrect about the course of human affairs. Ignoring the actual truth or falsity of specific claims, it should be obvious that claims about human conditions involve a theory of human behavior. Those claiming minorities do not suffer discrimination presented a theory about minority behavior and the relation of minorities to the larger society. (For the moment, I accept the authors presentation of themselves as scientists, not the paid propagandists I believe they really are.) The responsibility of society generally and individuals in particular is assigned by the theory, because that theory offers an explanation of observation. A different theory, such as my belief that minorities are probably impacted by discrimination in many ways, including poor health care, proposes a different ordering of social relations. For example, if discrimination is involved in poor health care, then responsibility for that deprivation can be assigned to the discriminators. Under the Conservative hypothesis, society is not responsible for acknowledged minority health care deficits.
 
Generally, political and legal processes make assignments of "cause and effect;" i.e., they propose a theory of causation which, in turn, is necessarily a theory of historical processes. In hearing an explanation of health care received by minorities, we are also hearing an ordering of society and history. This generality is necessary, because politics is about making decisions, making and administering laws, which involve the application of power to a problem. The assumption of legislation is that it will be effective.
Theories of morality - ethical theories - are caught up in the same considerations because morality is about judging and guiding behavior. We make decisions we hope will be effective. In this way, ethics is deeply involved in a Theory of History; i.e., causation. For voluntary decision makers, Hume's logical separation of 'ought' and 'is' does not apply. What ought to be not only presupposes what is, but orders physical relations so as to determine outcomes. We decide what ought to be, and make it so.
In traditional absolutist frameworks, making a decision is a monumental task. Since they suppose the Universe is mechanically ordered, every decision of Free Will alters events into the far distant future. My decision to eat a fish today conceivably influences what happens to cats a century, even a millenium, from now. Therefore, one has to think very carefully about what decides because of all  the far-flung consequences. Given human limitations, the probable outcome of human decisions is not entirely what was expected, which implies that humans do evil along with good.
 
Relativism relieves intelligent decision makers of a burden they cannot possibly carry: knowing the future absolutely. It is not necessarily the fault of decision makers when things go awry in a chaotic Universe because it is impossible to foresee every possible outcome. We are allowed to rely on the statistics of our common expectations and scientific knowledge in assigning outcomes. But that is not a ready-made excuse for bad behavior. In a chaotic world of relative value, the assignment of responsibility is not as clear as in an absolutist framework because the trace of motives and events is not given. The relativist view supports the modern legal notion, "innocent until proven guilty," because there is no preordained chain of events. It also supports the notion of responsibility (guilt) when it seems reasonable that someone perpetrated an immoral act, a crime. In a relativist world, the finding of guilt does not require absolute proof because no such proof can ever be given.
 
Traditional views do not support the assumption of innocence exactly because every human decision goes wrong somewhere. Traditionalists often claim humans are born with "original sin," meaning we are all guilty until declared innocent. Those traditional views seem to me internally consistent, but they are not compatible with modern democracy. Since it is a rare Conservative who does not defend those traditional views, Conservates are usually hostile to democracy but sympathetic to various forms of autocracy, monarchy, theocracy, etc.

Kant's Idealism

What are we to make of the Golden Rule, which is a popular, truncated version of Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative? Consider the simple example in which I give all my wealth to passers-by, hoping they will reciprocate. If the strategy worked, all wealth would become communal. In practice, most people grab as much as possible of what is offered, returning nothing. The Golden Rule does not work in practice in most adult social situations, even if it does work in a monastery, to some extent within the family, or among children. For that reason, the Golden Rule is most often interpreted as applying to intentions, not acts; i.e., it advises having "good intentions." That sheds some light on Kant's Categorical Imperative, which is stated in highly subjective terms as what one would will others do in similar cases. The Categorical Imperative is hypothetical, not direct, in its application.
 

Kant defended the Categorical Imperative as both the content and form of ethical principles. These are two quite different claims. The former idea has been disputed since he presented it, mostly because of the difficulty in applying it. Questions arise, such as how do we know the workings of other minds? Why should I assume that other minds work as mine does? How do I know others' intentions? What are similar circumstances? As a practical matter, the Categorical Imperative suffers two major problems. First, it is something each individual does, not something people do together; it is personal, not social. Second, it is an "imperative," a command, which is imposed from without. Each person is put in the position of obeying this command which, as it were, appears out of the aether. Unless one supposes a god or other authority, it is difficult to know the source of this Imperative. How or why would each person conceive this ethical principle?

Kant overcomes this last objection with his second claim, that the Categorical Imperative is the form of ethical princples. He intended to root his Categorical Imperative in rationality. He seems to assume, as did most Enlightenment thinkers, that there was a faculty of Reason imbedded in every intelligent being. Thus, voluntary choice was automatically under the guidance of rational choice. If the Categorical Imperative was a rational principle, then rational beings would have it "built in." This elevated the Categorical Imperative to a logical premise of the sort invoked in Euclid's Geometry.

I picked Kant for this discussion because his was the first, truly unique, attempt to explicate ethics since Ancient times. Most modern ethical philosophers have taken up ancient themes and tried to improve them. Thus most ethical philosophies are still involved with religious or cultural institutions. Kant was the first to seek a justification for ethical behavior that was not grounded in social practices. In that sense, he is the founder of modern ethics, as distinct from an apologist for one or another society. G.F.W. Hegel, for example, fell away from Kant's high standards in trying to prove that History ended in the German Reich. Adam Smith, who considered himself first a moral philosopher, unconsciously assumed the characteristic attitudes and relations of his Scotch background in his Capitalist theory. Bentham and Mills were typically English and, later, American, in their Utilitarian attitudes. All of these and others were unable to found ethics on any transcendental principle, as Kant claimed he had done. While I still don't know exactly what 'transcendental' means, Kant was unique in trying to base ethical considerations on principles not closely connected to any particular human society.
 
Unfortunately, it is no longer apparent that each person comes equipped with the faculty of Reason. Reason is something people learn as they grow up, which makes Reason subject to all the vagaries of human prejudice and inadequacy. What is Reason in Iran is Unreason in America. With that, Kant's foundation falls away. What's left is the urge to generalize.
The trouble with universal principles, imperatives and commandments is their application. Presumably, they apply to everything in every circumstance, which makes them either tautologies or inscrutable. Useful principles are limited in scope and, as Karl Popper would have it, falsifiable.

In Sum

In writing this article, I was motivated by a simple thought: there is a deep connection between how we understand History and ethical theories. How we explain Heroes and social action affects our ethical concepts. Or, everything is connected to everything.

In my denial of Universal History, but allowance of short term effects, there are immediate limitations on ethical theories. Concepts like moral evolution and moral evaporation makes sense, because, in fact, morality changes throughout history. Nonetheless, every voluntary choice implicitly assigns an order to the Universe, however short term. Whether the right choice was made can only be known in the matrix of conditions prevailing at the time. The same considerations apply to whether a wrong choice was made; i.e., whether we blame or praise the decision maker. That morality is contextual is the essential meaning of 'similar circumstances' in Kant's construction. The purists will immediately challenge such a brash statement, either in defense of Kant or offense againt him. But I maintain that we must make do with ambiguity, as we do in  science. How a moral decision applies is a matter of experiment just because we cannot fully and finally know the results.

The projection of short term order in making voluntary choices implies the existence of some generalization (premise) upon which the choice is founded. It is not necessary that the decision maker be aware of what is implied, but the fact of the decision is something that can be investigated. This formulation turns the Categorical Imperative and all the other absolutists schemes upside down. What we look for are intelligent agents who make voluntary choices, and the consequences of those decisions. From those observations we try to formulate general laws of morality and ethical principles.

WalterB - clock 18:24:46 - Monday, 09/25/2006

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